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Abstract
The unbundling of power generation and transmission in the restructured power system makes the coordinated
planning of power generation and transmission a new challenge for both generation and transmission enterprises. In 
this paper, a single-stage deterministic model is proposed to study the interaction of strategies between both 
enterprises, based on the game analysis of generation and transmission planning. Then, Cournot model is used to 
simulate the expansion strategies of generation and transmission enterprises. The equilibrium is obtained by using the 
Mixed Complementarity Problem approach. In addition, the proposed model is applied to a three-bus system, which 
verifies the feasibility of this model.
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1. Introduction
The optimization of coordination between GEP and TEP has always been a difficult issue in power 
system planning[1]. As for the power source planning, several considerations should be taken such as the 
correspondence between power supply and load, the transmission pattern and distance of the grid, the 
efficiency of transmission channel as well as the security and stability of grid structure during operation. 
Moreover, the smart grid will significantly change the operation mode of traditional power system, 
making the generation and transmission links progressively develop a flexible, diversified response mode.
For the coordination between the two links will have an enormous impact on the security and operational 
efficiency of power system[2], they should not be considered separately. Therefore, to ensure the safe, 
reliable and economic operation of power system under the background of smart grid development, it is 
necessary to make full consideration of the coordination between the generation and transmission at the 
planning level.
The transmission expansion planning is thought to coordinate with generation expansion planning and 
the two plans are researched separately in traditional power planning. Hu Ye, Yu Haihong (2010) studied 
the transmission planning method to achieve the optimal system operation condition under several 
scenarios, and the results indicated that dynamic programming (DP) is the most common method for
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power generation planning[3]. Yang Bin, Yu Yuefeng, Du Jianjun (2009) used genetic algorithms (GA) 
to study the power generation expansion planning[4]. According to the properties of natural monopoly 
and social utility of transmission network, Zhang Wuyang, Yao Jiangang (2009) studied how to guide the
power generation planning by determining power transmission expansion planning[5]. In this paper, game 
theory is introduced to research the GEP and TEP problems. Generation enterprises and transmission 
enterprises are considered as participants of the game respectively, determining their own planning by 
considering the maximum profits. Then the balance is obtained by the optimal complementary approach.
As a result, the interaction between GEP and TEP is considered, thus to help develop a more rational 
power planning.
2. Game analysis of generation and transmission planning 
2.1 The basic relationship of coordinated generation and transmission planning based on game theory
First, we use a dual-bus system to explain the basic relationship of coordinated generation and
transmission planning based on game theory.
Fig. 1. dual-bus system
As shown in figure 1, node 1 and node 2 each has a power plant, namely 1G and 2G . The electricity
demands of node 1 and node 2 are 1D and 2D respectively, 1D < 2D . Node 1 and node 2 are connected to
a transmission line.
Assuming that the market price is based on nodal price, the generation cost of each node is a quadratic 
function, as shown in the formula (1).
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The marginal cost of power generation node i is:
,i i i g iMC b c P= + (2)
MCi is the marginal cost of power generation on node i. It can be seen as the price of node i, namely 
λi . Blocking gain from line i to j is shown in the formula (3).
( ) ; 0ij j i ij ijCR F Fλ λ= − ≥ (3)
As it can be seen from formula (2), the node priceλi
Considering one extreme case, supposing that there is no transmission line between the two nodes, 
which means nodes 1 and 2 are independent. As shown at point A in figure 2 (a), all power generated by
is linear function of output power on this node.
Price functions of node 1 and node 2 are drawn in figure 2.
1G 1Dis given to , and all power generated by 2G 2Dis given to . Then, the price difference between the 
1G 2G
12F
1D 2D
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two nodes is P2-P1. Considering another extreme case by supposing the two nodes are in the same market 
for the transmission capacity is big enough and there is no transmission congestion, which makes the 
single market clearing price be P0 1G. As shown at point B, generates the power of P g,1 2D, and
generates the power of Pg,2. Transmission electricity from node 1 to node 2 is F12
A
B
P0
P1
P2
A
Pg,1 Pg,2
F12
D1 D2
(a)
(b)
P2-P1
A
B
.
Fig. 2. the impact of transmission limit on dual-bus system
Figure 2(b) shows that the price difference between the nodes is inversely proportional to the 
electricity transmission capacity. The price difference at point B is 0, on the contrary, the price difference 
at point A is largest. The price difference between nodes decreases as the ability of transmission increases
between A and B.
The market price in the blocking area (such as Node 2) will provide economic signals to attract new 
generation investment. On node 2, the new power plant is noted as newG2 . Here we consume that capacity
of the newly increased generation units is small, and its main purpose is to occupy the power generation 
market share on the node 2.
The decision variable of generation operators is the newly increased generation capacity P g,2. The 
decision variable of transmission enterprises is the power flow F 12 from node 1 to node 2. Equation (4)
and (5) illustrate the market prices of node 1 and 2.
1 1 1 ,1 1 1 1 12( )gb c P b c D Fλ = + = + + (4)
2 2 2 2 12 ,2( )
new
gb c D F Pλ = + − − (5)
2.2 Cournot equilibrium solution
For simplicity, the block income is part of the income of transmission enterprises. The goal of 
transmission operator is to maximize their profits by planning all the branches selected. The profit 
maximization problem for transmission enterprises can be expressed as follows:
2 1 12 ,12 12max max[( ) ]T opF C Fπ λ λ= − − (6)
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The profit maximization problem for new generation enterprises is expressed as follows:
2 ,2 , ,2max max( )G g inv g gP C Pπ λ= − (7)
Cop,12
C
: The operating expenses of line 1-2;
inv,g
The Cournot equilibrium can be obtained by a derivation process of the profit function of generation 
enterprises and transmission enterprises. The response functions of transmission enterprises and 
generation enterprises are shown respectively as follows.
: Investment cost of new generation capacity.
2 1 2 1 1 1 ,12 2 ,2
12 ,2
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It can be seen that the generation expansion on node 2 will reduce the profit of the transmission 
enterprises. On the other hand, the transmission expansion will also reduce the profit of generators. Thus 
the electricity planning includes games between generation enterprises and transmission enterprises under 
the market environment.
3. Planning model
3.1 Transmission planning model
The utmost and immediate concern of transmission enterprises in competitive market is to pursuit
maximum profit. Thus, in the transmission expansion planning model, transmission enterprises determine 
the expansion capacity of selected lines by maximizing the profit. The object function of this model is:
0max{ [( ) ] ( )}; 0ecj i ij TST ij op ij inv nm nm ij
i N j N
F R F C F C F F Fλ λ
∈ ∈
− + − − − ∀ ≥∑ ∑ (10)
The objective function presents the profit of transmission enterprises when choosing line nm for 
capacity expansion. nmF and 
ec
nmF are control variables, and Fnm in fact has already be involved in Fij
3.2 Generation planning model
.
The purpose of generation enterprises is to maximize their profit by making arrangement of generation
units. The object function of generation planning model is:
, , ,max{ }
ec
k g k op g k inv g kP C P C Pλ − − (11)
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The objective function presents the profit of the generation units expansion, and the control variables
in this problem are ,g kP and ,
ec
g kP .
3.3 The optimal model of market cleaning
The power market considered in this paper is N+1 pool mode which is still being adopted by many 
markets. In this kind of market, generation enterprises provide their supply function curves which is 
constitute of quantities and prices, then the independent system operator (ISO) determines the market 
clearing according to those supply function curves and the system stability. The objective of ISO is to 
minimize the tariff of customers by maintaining the balance between demand and supply. The optimal 
model of market clearing is:
2 2
, , , ,
1 1min ( ) ( ( ) )
2 2i g j i g j k g k k g ki N
b P c P b P c P
∈
+ + +∑ (12)
As the model ISO is to minimize the tariff of customers, it is not contradict with power flow problems 
in generation and transmission planning model.
3.4 Optimal solution of equilibrium
One of the most critical things for all market participates is to establish the equilibrium which provides
the optimal solution in different circumstances. In order to find the equilibrium point, we define the 
equilibrium as a kind of solution which can meet the objectives of GEP, TEP and the ISO models. In this 
solution, no one would choose to change its own strategy when other participates’ strategies are given.
The optimal solution can be obtained when we search the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker solution of generation 
enterprises, transmission enterprises and ISO. This is also a MCP which can be solved when transferred
into quadratic equation planning.
4. Application
In this part, the proposed model is applied to a three-bus system shown in figure 3. The data of
circuits and power plants are given in table 1 and table 2 respectively.
G1 G2
G2new
Node 1 Node 2
G3
Node 3
D2=590MWD1=75MW
D3=422MW
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Fig. 3. three-bus system
Table 1. Data of connecting lines
Line Reactance per meter Transmission capacity(MW)
1-2 0.02 310
1-3 0.02 470
2-3 0.02 480
Table 2. Data of generating station
Generator Maximum power generation capacity(MW)
coefficient
b ci
1G
i
2000 12 0.01
2G 1500 30 0.039
3G 2000 12.5 0.018
Assume that the growth rate of power load is 10%, and the lead time of generation and transmission 
planning are both 5 years. Here we use NPV to reflect the operating cash flow, and the parameters are 
listed as below.
, 84/MWhrinv gC =￥ ; , 63/MWhrop gC =￥ ; 10MWunitP = ;
161/MWhrTSTR =￥ ; 10MWlineF = ; ,12 35/MWhrinvC =￥ ; ,12 56/MWhropC =￥ ;
0
12 310MWF =
Then we analyze all expansion strategic choices of each market participants. Transmission enterprises 
have 2 strategies: conduct transmission expansion (TE) on line 1-2 or not (NTE). Generation enterprises
have 3 strategies: no generation expansion (NGE), conduct generation expansion with low supply (GEL), 
and conduct generation expansion with high supply. The supply function parameters of different 
strategies for generation enterprises are shown in table 3.
Table 3. Supply function parameters of different strategies
Parameters of supply function
b ci
GEH
i
23 0.02
GEL 18 0.02
The solution mentioned above is used to obtain the equilibrium of each strategy in the expansion 
process, so we can calculate the profit each participate in each strategy profile by substituting these
parameters in this case into each planning model, and table 4 shows the results.
Table 4. Profit in every strategy profile
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NTE TE
NGE (0,146300)(0.310)
(0,155400)
(0.430)
GEL (58100,115500)(400,310)
(29400,122500)
(350,400)
GEH (28700,117600)(350,310)
(24500,121800)
(320,370)
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In table 4, the first number of the bracket in the first column is the profit made by generation 
enterprises, while the second number is the profit made by transmission enterprises, and the unit of the
profit is ￥/hr. The first number of the bracket in the second column is generation expansion capacity, 
while the second is the profit of the transmission expansion capacity, and the unit is MW.
First, we can see the profit of transmission falls from ￥146300/hr to ￥115500/hr when comparing 
(NGE, NTE) with (GEL, NTE), and the congestion price of the transmission enter-price also sinks. The 
reduction is caused by newly increased generation investment which has decreased the price on node 2.
In the comparison of strategy (GEL, NTE) and strategy (GEH, NTE), we can see the generation 
capacity falls from 400MW to 350 MW. Furthermore, the profit of generation enterprises also drops from 
￥58100/hr to￥28700/hr. As the model consists of ISO scheduling problem, the high supply directly 
leads to the reduction of expansion capacity of G2. Also, because ISO dispatches much more generation 
from G3 to substitute G2, the market price of node 2 in (GEH, NTE) is lower than that in (GEL, NTE).
We can also get the difference between strategy (NGE, TE) and strategy (GEL, TE). The expansion
capacity of generation and transmission enterprises both drops down, and transmission enterprise can find 
the investment on node 2 will reduce the transmission demand on line 1-2. The expansion capacity drops
from 430MW to 400MW, which is also a spur to reduce the transmission service charge.
At last, from the comparison between strategy (GEL, TE) and (GEH, TE), we can see the profit of 
generation enterprises slumps while the profit of transmission enterprises barely changes. The generation 
expansion drops from 350MW to 320MW, in conventional practice, the transmission expansion capacity 
should increase. However, the transmission capacity also drops as the ISO dispatches more power from 
G3. The transmission enterprises realize this, so they reduce the expansion plan on line 1-2.
5. Conclusion
This paper brought up a single-stage deterministic model based on game theory after discussing the 
game theory and electric power market theory. This model can be used to analyze the strategic interaction 
between the generation enterprises and transmission enterprises. The model also includes planning model 
of generation and transmission enterprises as well as ISO scheduling problem. By this model, we can 
obtain the equilibrium through solving mixed complement problem, especially solving the discrete limit 
problem by deducing the quadratic programming model. Furthermore, the model is adopted into a three-
bus system and the practicality is verified, which can also be used in power system with large capacity.
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